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DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS' STATUTORY
RIGHT TO FAIR CASH VALUE:
Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.
by
MICHAEL G. SCHINNER"
INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 1981, investors around the country witnessed the opening
salvo to what would become "the largest action for relief to dissenting shareholders
in the judicial history of Ohio."' On that date, Mobil Corporation (Mobil) an-
nounced its offer to purchase up to forty million outstanding common shares of stock
in the Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) for $85 per share in cash.2 The offer was
contingent upon, among other things, the tendering by shareholders of at least thirty
million shares and the non-withdrawal of these tendered shares before the expiration
of the offer.' Mobil's acquisition of thirty million shares would guarantee it
ownership of approximately 51% of the outstanding shares. while its acquisition of
forty million would guarantee it ownership of approximately 68% of the outstanding
shares.' If successful, the tender offer would enable Mobil to elect a majority of the
directors.
5
Immediately following Mobil's offer, Marathon's Board of Directors called an
emergency meeting)At the meeting, the Board determined that the offer was grossly
J.D., University of Cincinnati. 1988: B.A.. College of Morut St. Joseph, 1985: Associate. Bancroft. Aver),
& McAlister, San Francisco.
' Price v. Marathon Oil Co.. No. 43273. slip op. at I (C.P. Ohio Dec. 27. 1983). This case is one of many
trial level cases that were consolidated into the principal case. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St.
3d 397.513 N.E.2d 776 (1987). Price, however, is the only trial level case that explains in detail the events
that precipitated tile filing of the Armstron, class action suit.
I Price. No. 43273, slip op. at I.
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.. No. C-2- 81 1402. slip op. at 8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7. 1981) (1981 W.L. 1713).
Id.
5 hi. at 9. Under section 1701.55(C) of the Ohio Revised Code, any shareholder following the statutorily
prescribed procedures may require the use ofcumulative voting in the election of directors. Oino REv. Cow:
ANN. § 1701.55(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987). Cumulative voting enables a shareholder to cumulate
the voting power hc possesses and "'give one candidate as many votes as is equaled by the number of directors
to be elected multiplied by the number of his votes, or to distribute his votes on the same principle among
two or more candidates, as he sees fit ... The purpose of cumulative voting is not to take away from the
majority the right to control, but rather to give to the minority some representation on the board of directors,
and, incidentally, a voice in the affairs of the corporation.' 12 Oi1io Jt i. 3o, Business Relationshl)s § 585
(1979). Still the minority will be unable toelect a majority of the board of directors ifthe majority shareholdes
cumulate their strength. i. Thus, if Mobil were to acquire 51 IX or 68'/ of Marathon's outstanding shares.
its controlling interest would enable it to control the Board of Directors.
"Armstrong,. 32 Ohio St. 3d at 398. 513 N.E.2d at 779.
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inadequate and not in the best interest of Marathon or its shareholders.7 Accordingly,
the Board authorized Marathon's officers to consider various ways to repel Mobil's
takeover attempt, including: (I) Sending letters to Marathon shareholders urging
them not to tender their shares to Mobil; (2) filing an action seeking to enjoin the
Mobil takeover; (3) initiating efforts to secure a "white knight;"' and (4) arranging
for a complete or partial liquidation of Marathon.
Marathon's officers opted for the second and third alternatives. On November
I, 1981, Marathon filed an action in the United States District Court for the Sixth
Circuit, alleging that the Mobil offer violated various federal antitrust regulations
and seeking to enjoin the planned takeover by Mobil."' The district court granted
Marathon's motion for preliminary injunctive relief,' and on two separate occasions
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the ruling.'
2
The preliminary injunction gave Marathon time to find a white knight. On
November 19, 1981, a merger agreement between Marathon and U.S. Steel was
announced.' Under the terms of the merger proposal, U.S. Steel would extend, until
December 4, 198 I, a tender offer for 5 1% of Marathon's outstanding stock on a pro
rata basis at a price of $125 per share.' After the December 4th deadline, the
remaining shareholders would receive a $ 100 face value twelve-year bond, paying
a guaranteed 12.5% interest, for each share of stock.' 5
I Id. at 398-99, 513 N.E.2d at 779. Early in 198 1. the management of Marathon recognized that its company
might be a "takeover" target because Marathon stock was selling on the New York Stock Exchange at a price
significantly lower than what the management estimated the per share value of the company's stock to be.
The estimated per share figures were the result of two studies, one internal and one external, which reported
a per-share value not lower than $188 and as high as $323. Id. at 398, 513 N.E.2d at 778-79.
One court has defined -white knight" as:
[A] word of art used to describe potential merger partners with whom a target company
negotiates toward the realization of a merger on terms which the target company manage-
ment finds acceptable: essentially the "white knight" is a merger partner who is willing to
negotiate the terms of the anticipated merger ... 11 In other words the white knight pursues
ownership by means ofa "sweetheart deal'" with the incumbent management. while a raider
deals directly with the shareholders.
American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp.. 493 F. Supp. 721. 732 & n. 19 (E.D. Va. 1980).
iArstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 399, 513 N.E.2d at 779.
'" Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp.. 530 F. Supp. 315. 317 (N.D. Ohio). qfl'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981).
reqa/fd, 669 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.). cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). laintiff Marathon brought the action
under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 26, seeking to enjoin defendant Mobil from acquiring its
company. Marathon, 530 F. Supp. at 317. Marathon asserted thia a merger of the two companies would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, which prohibits acquisitions that lessen competition or
tend to create monopolies. Id.
I Id. at 326. The court based its decision on evidence that Mobil's takeover would give that company the
largest or second largest share of the gasoline market in each of six states: Illinois, Indiana. M ichigan. Ohio,
Tennessee. and Wisconsin. Id. at 323.
,2 Under the same case name,Marat/on Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., the Sixth Circuit first upheld the injunction
on December 23, 198 1. Marathon, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981 ) cert. deiied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). Two
weeks later, on January 4, 1982, the Sixth Circuit again upheld the ruling. Maratlon. 669 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.
1982).
" Arnstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 399, 513 N.E.2d at 779.
" Id. at 399-400, 513 N.E.2d at 779-80.
," Id. Actually the follow-up merger was to be with a subsidiary of U.S. Steel, called U.S.S. Corporation.
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DISSEN'tING SHAREHOLDER'S RIGHTS
By December 4, 1981, approximately 91.4% of Marathon shares had been
tendered to U.S. Steel. 6 Accepting the tender of these shares on a pro-rated basis,
U.S. Steel purchased 51% of Marathon stock on January 7, 1982.,7 Subsequently, at
a special shareholders meeting held on March 11, 1982, shareholders owning more
than two-thirds of all Marathon shares, including the 51% now owned by U.S. Steel,
approved the merger."I
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981).
The agreement had two significant conditions. First. it gave U.S. Steel an -'irrevocable option to
purchase ten million authorized but unissued shares of Marathon common stock for $90 per share." Mobil,
669 F.2d at 367. "These shares equalled approximately 17% of Marathon's outstanding shares." Id.
Second. in the event U.S. Steel's offer did not succeed and a third party gained control of Marathon, the
agreement gave U.S. Steel an option to purchase a 48% interest in the Yates Field for $2.8 billion. Yates Field
was one of Marathon's largest assets--its "crown jewel." Id.
Mobil challenged these conditions in federal court, alleging that they served as a "lock-up"
arrangemenlt to defeat competitive offers, thereby constituting a manipulative practice in connection with a
tender offer in violation of section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). Id. at 368.
On November 24. 198 1. the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted in
part Mobil's motion for a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Marathon and U.S. Steel from taking any
action in connection with the tenderofferof the Yates Field option. /d. at 368-69. Mobil thereafter announced
a new bid, offering to purchase at least 30 million common shares of Marathon stock at $126 per share in cash.
Id. at 369. The offer, however, was conditioned on findings by the federal appellate court that the U.S. Steel
stock option and the Yates Field option were invalid, Id.
On December 7. 1981. shortly after Mobil's amended offer, the district court denied a preliminary
injunction, hi. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the two options
constituted '"manipulative" practices in connection with the tender offer. Id. The court of appeals defined
"manipulation" as "an affecting of the market for. or price of. securities by artfiial means. i.e.. means
unrelated to the natural forces of supply and demand." /i. at 369, 374 (emphasis in original). Even though
the terms of the option agreements were fully disclosed, the court found that the options circumvented the
natural forces of market demand and thus constituted manipulative conduct in violation of section 14(e) of
the Williams Act. Id. at 376.
In fashioning appropriate equitable relief, the district court, on remand, extended the date by which
shareholders could withdraw their acceptance of the U.S. Steel offer until January 6. 1982. Armstrong, 32
Ohio St. 3d at 399-400, 513 N.E.2d at 780. The court, however, did not change the December 4, 1981,
proration date: that is. the date by which Marathon shareholders had to tendei their shares to U.S. Steel. Id.
The Mobil decision was the subject of much judicial criticism: indeed, its holding was specifically
rejected by a number of federal courts. See. eg., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1,
5 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering disclosure requirements of Rule 14e-2, court stated purpose of Williams Act
was to ensure that shareholders need not respond to tender offer without adequate information; Act requires
disclosure of'rnaterial objective matters"). 'erl. denied. 465 U.S. 1052 (1984): Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp.. 717 F.2d 757. 760 (2d Cir.) (holding that no section 14(e) manipulation could exist absent evidence
of misrepresentation ornondisclosure),cert. denied.464 U.S. 10 18 (1983): Dan River. Inc. v. Icahn. 701 F.2d
278, 288 n. 1( (4th Cir. 1983) (sole purpose of section 14(e) is to afford adequate disclosure to sharehold-
ers of target corporation): Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.. 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md. 1982)
(concluding that action under section 14(e) requires demonstration that some deception has occurred): see
also, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.. 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir.) (section 14(e) designed to provide
shareholders considering tenderofferwith adequate information), c''rt. denied.454 U.S. 1092 (1981): Lewis
v. McGraw. 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.) (sole purpose of section 14(e) is protection of investors confronted
with tender offer: accordingly, one element of section 14(e) cause of action is proof there was misrepresen-
tation upon which shareholders of target company relied), ceri. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980).
"Armsrong. 32 Ohio St. 3d at 399.513 N.E.2d at 779. 'By way of contrast, approximately 47% of Marathon
shares had been tendered to Mobil in response to its tender offer of $85 per share." Id.
' Id. at 400, 513 N.E.2d at 780.
.s Id.
Winter, 19891
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AKRON LAW REVIEW
Thereafter, Frances A. Armstrong, an owner of two hundred shares of
Marathon stockjoined with other dissenting shareholders and commenced an action
in the Hancock County Common Pleas Court. These shareholders sought a
determination and award of the "fair cash value" of their stock pursuant to section
1701.85 of the Ohio Revised Code."'5 At the ensuing trial, the dissenting sharehold-
ers presented evidence that the value of Marathon stock on March 10, 1982 was
between $163 and $235.21 One expert testified that the value was $200 a share, plus
or minus fifteen percent, and another expert testified that the value was approxi-
mately $197 a share. 2' Marathon, on the other hand, introduced expert testimony
that, absent the effect of the pending merger, the per-share value of Marathon stock
on March 10, 1982, would be as low as $47.43. -2 The trial court found the per-share
value of Marathon stock to be $78 per share.
2
1
Both parties subsequently appealed from the judgment with respect to the trial
court's method of valuating the Marathon stock. The Court of Appeals of Hancock
County Ohio reversed the lower court's decision.24 On appeal to the Ohio Supreme
Court, held: "affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded."" Where facts
presented to the trial court evidence a reasonably active market for the particular
corporate stock in question, the fair cash value is properly measured as the stock
market price of the shares as of the day prior to that on which the shareholders vote
on the corporate transaction. 2' This valuation would exclude any appreciation or de-
" Id. (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987)).
"'Pricey. Marathon Oil Co.. No. 5-84-4-5-84-9,slipop. at6-7 (Ct. App.OhioJan. 14. 1986)( 1986W.L. 808).
Section 1701.85(C) dictates that fair cash value is to be determined the day prior to the shareholders' vote
on the merger in question. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.895(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987).
Price. at 6-7.
hi. at 7.
2- hi.
'4 Id. at 32.
-Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.. 32 Ohio St. 3d 397,422,513 N.E.2d 776. 798 (1987). The supreme court
agreed with the appellate court's ruling that the trial court had erred in its fair cash value determination. The
court, however, disagreed with the appellate court's analysis. Therefore. the court took the opportunity to
resolve the lowercourt's incorrect and inconsistent interpretations of sectionI 1701.85(C) of the Ohio Revised
Code, the statute providing for the payment of fair cash value to dissenting shareholders. Accordingly, the
court reversed the matter and remanded it to the trial court. hi. at 41 1-13, 513 N.E.2d at 789-91.
The court addressed several other issues, including: (I jThe eligibility of ccrtain Marathon sharehold-
ers to participate in the proceeding based upon whether they had complied with the notice requirement
contained within section 1701.85(A) of the Ohio Revised ('ode: (2) whether the court of appeals erred by
holding that the trial court had abused it discretion in denying notions for a continuance of the scheduled trial
on the merits to permit a group ol dissenting shareholders to cngage in pretrial discovery upon the issue of
faircash value; (3) whether the Ohio Constitution guarantees the right to ajury trial in a valuation proceeding
brought pursuant to section 1701.85: (4) whether a joinder of other causes of action is permitted under a
proceeding brought pursuant to section 1701.85: and (5) whether the trial court improperly determined the
rate of prejudgment interest. hi. at 398, 513 N.E.2d at 778. These issues, and the court's concomitant
analyses. however. are beyond the scope of this Article.
Id. at 397, syl. paras. 2 .3, 513 N.E.2d at 776, syl. paras. 2. 3.
Note: The syllabus of an opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court states the controlling points of law. See
Rule I(B) of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions. Because the opinion merely
discusses these controlling points of law, this Article attempts to cite to the syllabus wherever possible.
[Vol. 22:3
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Common Law Treatment of A4inority Shareholders
Under the early common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequi-
site to carry out fundamental corporate transactions such as a merger or consolida-
tion of the corporation or a sale of all or substantially all of its assets.- As commerce
exploded in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the common law requirement
of unanimity proved to be a formidable barrier in the development of corporate
America.2- Accordingly, to forestall minority shareholders from exercising what
could be called a "tyrannical" hold upon the corporation, legislatures responded by
enacting statutes that permitted the making of fundamental corporate changes by a
majority vote of the shareholders. 31 This, however, opened the door to victimization
of the minority shareholder.
3 '
Appraisal Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
To resolve this dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting minority to recover
the appraised value of its shares from the corporation were widely adopted.
32 These
2 Armstrong, 32 Ohio St 3d. at 397, syl. para. 3. 513 N.E.2d at 776, syl. para. 3.
21 Id. at 402-03, 513 N.E.2d 781-82: see also, 12B W. Ft rcm-R, CYCLOPEIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVAE
CORPORATIONS § 5906. 1, at 342 (1984): Lattin. Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal
Statutes. 45 HARv. L. RE-v. 233. 236-37 (1931): Levy. Rights o#*Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and
Payment. 15 CORNNt.. L.Q. 420. 420-22 (1930): Weiss. /The Law of" Take Out Mergers: A Historical
Perspective. 56 N.Y.U. L. Ri-v. 624. 624-28 (1981): Note, The Right of Shareholders Dissenting from
Corporate Combinations to Demand Cash Payment.for Their Shares. 72 HARV. L. REV. I 132, 1143 (1959);
Note. Vahiation o/'Dissenters" Stock Under Appraisal Statutes. 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 1453-54 (1966)
[hereinafter Valuation of'Dissenters" Shares]: Note, T'he Appraisal Remedy in Illinois Under 7'he 1983
Business CrporationAct: Some Su, gestionsforIlmprovemtent. 19 J. MARSI]At.L L. Rev. 229.229-30. (1985):
Note, A Reconsideration of'the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's Right of[Appraisal.
74 Mich. L. REv. 1023, 1026-28 (1976) [hereinafterA Reconsideration; Note, CorpOration Law--Dissenting
Stockholder's Right ojAppraisal--Deterniiiiation of Value, 28 N.Y.U. L. RIv. 1021, 1021-22 (1953); Note,
The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKtA. L. REV. 629, 629-30 (1977) [hereinafter The
Dissenting Shareholder'sl; Note, CTrorations--Corporate Comhination--De Facto Merger caud Stock-
holder Appuaisal Rights. 14 Sw. L.J. 276, 277-78 (1960); Note, Corporations--Stockholders" Appraisal
Rights--Dissenting Stockholders o'Purchasing Corporation Protected by Ohio Statute, 35 U. CIN. L. REV.
704, 704 (1966): Note. Corporate Law--Chipping Away at the Delaware Block: A Critique o'the Delaware
Block Approach to the Valuation oJDissenters' Shares in Appraisal Proceedings. 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
191. 193-99 (1986) [hereinafter Corporate Law--Chipping Awa%].
' See su ra note 28 for articles discussing the development of shareholder consent requirements necessary
to effect fundamental corporate change.
Annotation. Valuation of Stock ol Dissenting Stockholders in Case of Consolidation or Merger ol'
Corporation. Sale of its Assets, or the Like. 48 A.L. R.3d 430. § 21 a I ( 1973). Today. all states have some statute
providing that unanimity is no longer a requirement for shareholders to approve fundamental corporate
changes such as mergers or a sale of assets. See Note. The Dissenting Shareholder's. supra note 28. at 630.
" See W. FLtrrc ER supra note 28. at 343 § n. I.
' Id. Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia provide appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders.
DISSFNTING StlARFHIOI.IER'S RIGHTSWinter, 19891
5
Schinner: Dissenting Shareholder's Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
appraisal rights served to strike a balance between the interest of the majority in
effecting corporate change and the interest of the minority in not being forced to hold
stock in a corporation radically different from the one in which they invested. 33The
statutes which prescribe these appraisal proceedings are typically simple and straight
forward. Many statutes provide for a mandatory appointment of appraisers to deter-
mine the value of the dissenters' shares. 4 Of those statutes, most permit the courts
to review the report of the appraisers. 35 Should a court find the figures to be arrived
at arbitrarily or based upon unreasonable evidence, the court may establish its own
valuation. 3 ' Still other statutes provide that the trial court has discretion in the
appointment of appraisers but must, after hearing all the evidence, make its own de-
termination of the value of the dissenting shareholders' stock. 37 Finally, in one state,
it is the jury who determines the value of a dissenters' shares.
3
1
While the proceedings to determine the value of the dissenters' stock are laid
out in technical detail, the statutes scarcely ever define the actual valuation
methodology to be used .39The statutes may be divided into two classes for purposes
of comparative analysis. According to Professor Lattin, "[t]he first type, and most
numerous, prescribes an appraisal and payment of the 'value,' the 'fair value' or the
'fair cash value.' The second type calls for an appraisal and payment of the 'market
value' or the 'full market value." ''4 . Regarding the second type, the legislatures
undoubtedly intended to have the shares appraised on a market basis if such a market
existed.4' As suggested in In Re Capital Stock of Morris Canal & Banking Co., what
is meant by "market value" is "the market value of the stock as shown by other sales
of such stock made between willing sellers and willing buyers.' 42 Stock actively
traded on one of the exchanges would seem to satisfy this definition of "market
value.' 43
See Note. Corporate Law-Chipping Away. supra note 28. at 198-99 & nn. 32-33.
31 See sspra note 28 for articles discussing the purpose of the appraisal remedy. Appraisal rights have been
criticized on several grounds. Corporations that must buy back shares from dissenting shareholders may find
that they no longer have a cash supply sufficient to complete the acquisition. Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essavfir Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 234 (1962). If the purchase price that the
corporation must pay is substantial, the owners of a small percentage of the stock could make the transaction
impracticable and would, therefore, possess bargaining power disproportionate to the number of shares they
own. Id.
31 See W. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at § 5906.8. at 375.
31 Id. at § 5906.8, at 376. For the most part, however, the courts will generally leave the appraisers' report
undisturbed. Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 375.
" Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1202(g)( I)).
31 See Lattin, siqura note 28, at 244.
"I Id. at 258.
41 Id. at 258-59.
12 Id. at 259 (quoting In r-e Capital Stock of Morris Canal & Banking Co., 104 N.J.L. 526, 528, 141 A. 784,
785 (1928)).
43 Indeed, a number of statutes define "market value" as referring to the stock market value when the stock
is traded upon national securities exchanges, or, more specifically, traded upon the New York Stock
Exchange. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1201 (1987 Cum. Supp.) (specifying New York Stock Exchange
as market value indicator for valuation purposes).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3
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DISSENTING SIIAREIIOLDER'S Rictrrs
No similar criterion has emerged from the courts' attempts to define "value,"
"fair value," and "fair cash value." As one court has said: "[W]hether the statute
calls for the payment of value, fair value, or fair cash value, makes little difference
since the terms are considered synonymous ... The real objective is to ascertain the
actual worth of that which the dissenter loses." 44 Traditionally, courts and appraisers
have limited their choice of valuation to one of three methods: Net asset value, net
earnings value, and market value.4 Over the past few decades, however, many courts
have adopted an eclectic or compromise theory of appraisal, by which the value of
the business depends to some extent on each of the three methods.46 Under this
"weighting method," the courts or the appraisers look to the facts of a particular case
and assign each component a percentage in accordance with its relative impor-
tance. 7 This method is known as the "Delaware block approach" 4" and is based on
the premise that no one factor is determinative of value and that each value should
carry some, but not conclusive, weight.4"
Courts have used the Delaware block approach "for roughly forty years" with
no apparent justification.5" In recent years, however, the Delaware block approach
has come underjudicial and scholarly criticism:" In February of 1983, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.. addressed the inadequacies of the
appraisal remedy and restructured the valuation method.5 2 The Weinberger holding
significantly affected the rights of minority shareholders by prohibiting the use of the
Delaware block method to the extent that it excluded other valuation techniques
generally accepted by the financial community. 5 3The Weinherger court described
the Delaware block's formulaic approach to the valuation process as "clearly out-
moded" and discordant with the purpose and intent of the statutory remedy available
SWarren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 220 Md. 478. 482-83, 154 A.2d 796. 799 (1959) (footnote omitted).
15 See Note. Corporate Law--Chpping A wa'.', supra note 28, at 192.
11 Id. (citing I J. BONRIGHr, VALUATIJON OF PROPER'rY 223 (1937)).
" See Note, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Freeze-Outs: Questions ql'Valuttion and E.,clusivit. 38
Sw. L.J. 775,779(1984). Forexample. the percentage assigned to the market value of a corporation not listed
on a stock exchange or infrequently traded would be relatively low. See Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores.
Inc.. 35 Del. Ch. 560. 123 A.2d 121 (1956).
" See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). Although courts have used the "'weighting
method" for roughly forty years, the technique was not labeled as the "Delaware block" approach until the
last decade. See Note, Corporate Law--Chipping'Away. sqra note 28, at 192-93 & n. 10. Ironically, it was
the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, rather than a Delaware court, that first coined the
tenn. d. at n. 10 (citing Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Amfac. Inc., 59 F.R.D. 116, 125 (D. Haw. 1973)).
The term was slow to catch on. but after a decade and a half, the Hawaiian court's denomination has become
well-accepted. Id. (citing to Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 931 (Del. 1983); Piemonte v. New
Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719. 724. 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1979): Blasingame v. American
Materials. Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659.668 & n. I (Tenn. 1983): W. Fi: rcIHtR. s1ra note 28, at § 5906.12: Kanda
& Levmore. TheAppraisalReinedy and the Goals #'Corporate Law. 32 UCLA L. Rev. 429.439 n.36 (1985)).
See Krishna, Determining the ''Fair V'aluue" 0J'CaTporate Shares. 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 132, 157 (1987).
Note, COrporate Law--Chipping Avo'. stqua note 28, at 193 (citing Schaefer. 77te Fallac ' of Weighting
Asset Value and Earnings Value in the Appraisal of Coporate Stock. 55 S. Csi,. L. Rrv. 1031, 1032 (1982)).
1' Id. (citing Schaefer, supra note 50, at 1033).
1' 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
53/d. at 712-13.
Winter, 19891
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to dissenting shareholders.54
Courts around the country have responded to Weinberger in different ways.
Some courts have refused to modify their use of the Delaware block with the more
liberal approach espoused by Weinberger. Other courts have liberalized their
appraisal standards by allowing the use of valuation methods other than the
Delaware block approach.5' To ascertain the stock's actual worth or its "intrinsic
value," these courts have adopted analyses that permit them to consider a number
of factors. These factors include: "Net asset value; going concern value; liquidation
value; net equity value; earnings value of the stock or dividends prospects; the nature
of the enterprise and its relative position within the particular industry; post-merger
gains or synergistic gain; tax benefits to all concerned; and rescission and equitable
concerns." 5' These approaches, however, can be expensive, unpredictable, and
susceptible to subjective applications.5' Thus, faced with competing considerations
of cost, fairness, and efficiency, some legislatures, like that of Ohio, have gone the
more economically feasible and administratively easier route. Specifically, they
have adopted just one test: The willing seller, willing buyer (hypothetical market)
test. 9 Although these statutes contain some flexibility in their application, where an
actual market is deemed to be sufficiently active in its trading of the stock in question,
then the actual market price is given a preferred status over other valuation data.6"
OHIO'S APPRAISAL STATUTE AND RELATED CASE LAW
Ohio's original statute authorizing appraisal rights to dissenting sharehold-
ers was section 8623-72 of the Ohio General Code.' That section provided that,
. Id. Under title 8, section 262(h) of the Delaware Code, the Court of Chancery:
shall appraise the shares, determining theirftir value exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation,
together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be
the ft ir value. In determining such fifir value, the Court shall take into account all
relevant factors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983) (emphasis added).
"See. e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929,940 (Del. 1985) ("Weinbergerdid not abolish the block
formula, only its-exclusivity as a tool of valuation"); Leader v. Hycor, Inc.,.395 Mass. 215, 224,479 N.E.2d
173. 178 (1985) ("We do not agree that the 'Delaware block method' for valuing closely held stock.. is
outmoded" (footnote omitted)): Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc.. 654 S.W.2d 659,668 & n. I (Tenn.
1983) ("We do not find anything in Weinberger that causes us to alter the adoption of the weighted average
method").
"' See. e.g.. Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557. 571,483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 675,473 N.E.2d 19, 27
(1984) (factors used in appraisal proceeding would include but would not be limited to net asset value, book
value, earnings, market value, and investment value); Dermody v. Sticco, 191 N.J. Super. 192, 196,465 A.2d
948, 950 (1983) (all relevant factors must be considered in arriving at fair value).
' Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 404, 513 N.E.2d 776, 783-84 (1987).
' See id. at 408-10, 513 N.E.2d at 786-88.
., See, e.g.. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987) (adopting the willing seller-
willing buyer test).
t"See Vought v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 117 Ohio App. 389, 391. 192 N.E.2d 332. 333 (1962).
"' Onio GEN. CODE ANN. § 8623-72 (Anderson 1938).
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in the absence of contrary provisions in a corporation's articles of incorporation,
dissenting shareholders were entitled to be paid the fair cash value of their shares as
of the day before the vote authorizing the sale or merger of the corporation.62
Nowhere in the statute, however, was the term "fair cash value" defined.
One of the earliest decisions in Ohio that attempted to give meaning to the term
"fair cash value" was Miller '. Canton Motor Coach, Inc..6 3In Miller, Adam Miller
brought an action against Canton Motor Coach, Inc., a corporation in which Miller
owned stock.64 After the company's directors had agreed upon a sale of all the
company's assets, they called a meeting of the stockholders to obtain formal
approval.6" With the exception of Miller, all the company's stockholders voted to
approve the sale." Pursuant to the provisions of section 8623-72 of the Ohio General
Code, Miller demanded the fair cash value for his stock in the amount of $300 per
share..6 7 The company countered with an offer of $40.91 per share, a figure much
closer to the per share book value of $43.00." Two of the three court-appointed
appraisers, after an apparently careful investigation and examination of the records
of the company, fixed the value of Miller's stock at $156 per share.6 ' The third
appraiser, filed a minority report in which he strongly disagreed with the conclusion
of the majority as to the value of the stock. 71' Nonetheless, the court approved the
majority report and rendered judgment for Miller in the amount of $156 a share.7'
On appeal from the trial court's decision, the Stark County Court of Appeals
faced an important question: What factors were to be considered in arriving at ajust
figure for the payment to a dissenting shareholder?7 2 With a paucity of Ohio case law
to guide it, the court turned to the leading case on the question of determining a
stock's fair cash value, In Re Clark's Will.7 3 The New York Court of Appeals had
indicated in Clark's Will that the factors to be considered in determining fair cash
value would vary from case to case and that no rule could govern every case.74
1hi. To qualify for the faircash value of his shaes. tihe dissenting shareholder had to make a written demand
for the payment of such fair cash ValuC. stating the nunber and kind of shares held, and the amount claimed
as their fair value. Omo Riv. Coimi ANN. § 8623-72 (Anderson 1938).
"'58 Ohio App. 94 16 N.F.2 486 (1937).
It/. at 95. 16 N.E.2d at 487.
U' Id.
W, /d.
"n Id.
id.
Id. Section 8623-72 of the Ohio General Code charged the courts to appoint three appraisers to ascertain
the fair cash value of a dissenters share of stock. A reasonable determination of fair cash value by a majority
of the appraisers would bind the courL to that determination. Omo Riv. Cooi ANN. § 8623-72 (Anderson
1938).
' Miller, 58 Ohio App. at 95. 16 N.E.2d at 487.
711 d.
'2 hi. at 96. 16 N.E.2d 488.
'3 Id. at 97-98, 16 N.E.2d at 488 (citing In re Fulton. 257 N.Y. 487. 178 N.E. 766 (1931)). [Note. The Miller
court incorrectly cited to In re Fulton. rather than the proper case name hl re Clark's Willl.
74 257 N.Y. at 494-95. 178 N.E. at 769.
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Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Miller court found that the
appraisers had appropriately considered a number of relevant factors, including the
company's income, its franchise value, its actual and potential earnings, and the net
worth of its physical assets.75 The court concluded that fair cash value is not simply
the market price, rather fair cash value is measured by the corporation's intrinsic
worth.76
The Ohio Supreme Court first defined fair cash value" in Roessler v. Security
Savings & Loan Co., a case very similar to Miller.77 The plaintiffs in Roessler were
owners of a large number of shares of stock in the defendant corporation, Security
Savings & Loan Company.7" After a shareholder vote authorized a merger with
another savings and loan company, the plaintiffs dissented in writing and demanded
the fair cash value of their shares in the amount of $160 per share.79 The defendant
countered with an offer of $25 per share." ' In a proceeding to determine the fair cash
value of the plaintiffs' shares, the three court-appointed appraisers found the value
of the dissenters' shares to be $43.50 each." The trial court confirmed this amount.1
2
The court, however, had instructed the appraisers to use market value rather than
intrinsic value in making their determination."
The issue facing the Ohio Supreme Court was whether the trial court had
committed prejudicial error in its instruction to the appraisers regarding the proper
construction of fair cash value. 4 The court began its review by canvassing how other
states had interpreted "fair cash value" and similar terms." Based on its findings,
the court concluded that, in a proceeding brought pursuant to section 8623-72 of the
General Code, the term "fair cash value" meant intrinsic value." As such, the
instruction to the appraisers erroneously defined fair cash value as market value to
7 Miller, 58 Ohio App. at 98-99, 16 N.E.2d at 488-89.
, Id. at 99. 16 N.E.2d at 489. Accord Wisman v. Cleveland Ry. Co.. 25 Ohio Op. 281,286 (C.P.) ("fair cash
value of... stock ... means what the stock is worth intrinsically and not necessarily its market price, and
... there are many factors to be considered in arriving at such value"), qaId. 39 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 52 N.E.2d
865 (Ct. App. 1943).
7 Roessler v. Security Sav. & Loan Co., 147 Ohio St. 480, 72 N.E.2d 259 (1947).
I hd. at 481. 72 N.E.2d at 259.
" hil.
Id. at 48 1. 72 N.E.2d at 259-60.
s2hi.
Id. at 483. 72 N.E.2d at 260. The trial court instructed the appraisers using the following language:
The term "fair cash value" means a sum equal to the price which it is reasonably
probable would have resulted from a sale of said shares for cash, after fair negotiations
between a bona fide purchaser. able and willing to buy for cash. but under no
compulsion to buy, and an owner willing to sell. bul under no compulsion to sell, al[er
fair and reasonable efforts to obtain the purchase- who would pay the highest pricc.
excluding from said price, however, any appreciation or depreciation therein in
consequence of the merger hereinbefore mentioncd.
Id.
1 Id. at 482. 72 N.E.2d at 260.
15 Id.
" Id. at 480, syl. para. 1, 72 N.E.2d at 259, syl. para. 1.
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the prejudice of the plaintiffs."The court noted that in certain instances market value
can be considered an element of intrinsic value, but it should not be the sole or basic
test; there are numerous other factors a court or an appraiser should consider when
determining fair cash value."8 The court enumerated several of these factors,
including: "the business of the defendant and its prospects of its business for the
future; the nature of its property; its financial condition: the value of its assets; the
amount and nature of its fixed and contingent liabilities; its earnings in the past and
its prospects of earnings in the future; and the dividends paid by it in the past and its
prospects for paying dividends in the future."I' Other factors included the defen-
dant's "management and reputation; the value of its good will; the market value of
its shares; and its future prospects in a financial way."'" In sum, Roessler held that
in order to determine fair cash value a court must consider "every factor bearing on
value."'"
In response to Roessler, the Ohio General Assembly enacted section 1701.85(C)
of the Ohio Revised Code on October I1, 1955.12 Section 1701.85(C) defines the fair
cash value of dissenting stock as that amount which a willing seller, under no
compulsion to sell, would be willing to accept and a willing buyer, under no
compulsion to purchase, would be willing to pay. '3The statute fixes as the valuation-
date the day prior to the shareholder vote approving a merger or sale of the
corporation's assets. "4To prevent creating a formula too rigid to take into consid-
eration the exigencies of each individual case, the statute also provides that any
appreciation or depreciation in the share's value resulting from the proposal acted
upon at the shareholders meeting should be excluded.
9 5
In Vought v. Republic-Franklin Insurance Co., the Ohio Court of Appeals for
Franklin County provided one of the first discussions of the meaning and application
SId. at 480, syl. para. 2. 72 N.E.2d at 259, syl. para. 2.
/ i. at 482-83.72 N.E.2d at 260.
/ /i. at 483.72 N.E.2d at 260-61.
"'I. at 483.72 N.E.2d at 261.
/t/. at 483, 72 N.E.2d at 260.
1955 Ohio Laws 432. 485.
Onto R rv. Cot-. ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987). It was the Ohio State Bar Association
Committee that recommended adding the willing buyer-willing seller language to section 1701.85(C).
According to the Committee:
(Division (C)l contains a frequently used definition of' "fair cash value.'' This
definition is one that is found in a great mass of judicial decisions both in Ohio and
elsewhere, in litigation involving the value of property, in appropriation suits, tax
controversies, and other legal proceedings in which property must be valued. It is
believedthat thisdefinition will givethe Baraclearertest than that of" intrinsic value"
established by the Supreme Court in Roessler v. Securit " Savings & Loan Co.
Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397. 406. 513 N.E.2d 776. 785 (1987) (qoting 28 Ohio B.
102 (1955)).
In addition to Ohio, a small but growing minority of states presently defines the value of a share by
the willing buyer-willing seller test. Id. at 407 n. 12, 513 N.E.2d 776, 785 n. 12. "Obviously, market price
of the stock is the focus of such valuation." Id.
,, Omo R:v. Cooc ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987).
" See id.
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of the statute's willing seller-willing buyer definition. 6 The plaintiffs in Vought
dissented from a merger of the defendant Republic- Franklin Insurance CompanyY7
Pursuant to the provisions found in section 1701.85 of the Ohio Revised Code, the
plaintiffs brought an action seeking a determination of the fair cash value of their
shares." A majority of the three court-appointed appraisers set the per share value
at $3.28, a figure confirmed by the court." The dissenting shareholders appealed,
contending that section 1701.85(C) did not apply where there was "no willing
buyer-willing seller transaction as of the day before the merger vote."""'In such an
instance, they argued, the standard of valuation should have been the "intrinsic
value."''
The court disagreed with this argument. Stating that the adoption of section
1701.85, including its definition of fair cash value, was a legislative overruling of the
holding of Roessler, the Vought court rejected the intrinsic value test." 2 Instead, the
court adopted the standard of a hypothetical market of willing buyers and sellers as
provided for in the statute."" Under such a standard, evidence could be introduced
as to any factor that a reasonable person would take into consideration to ascertain
value. According to the court, the legislature's objective in adopting the willing
buyer-willing seller standard was to measure value by a hypothetical market rather
than an actual one."' An actual market was simply evidence of market value. " "-
By way of dictum, however, the Vought court asserted that certain types of
evidence--for example, the existence of an actual market in which active trading
occurred--might be so persuasive as to invoke a legally preferred status over more
speculative methods of valuation such as original cost and capitalization of earnings. "'
The court pointed out that this statement would probably be true in most cases
involving the valuation of stock that was actively traded on the New York Stock
Exchange." 7 However, since there was no active trading in this particular case, the
Vought court's conclusion constituted mere dictum."x
The same court of appeals did face such a case, however, several years later in
Parten v. Pure Oil Co.. ""' The plaintiffs in Patten. after dissenting from a proposed
"" 117 Ohio App. 389. 192 N.E.2d 332 (1962).
17 Id. at 389. 192 N.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 389-90. 192 N.E.2d at 333.
eil. at 390. 192 N.E.2d 333.
Idh.
10 d.
1( l. at 391. 192 N.E.2d at 334.
l' I. at 390-91, 192 N.E.2d at 333-34.
'' Id. at 390-91. 192 N.E.2d at 334.
''4 hi. at 390. 192 N.E.2d at 333.
" hi. at 391. 192 N.E.2d at 333.
117 Id.
"' hi. at 390. 192 N.E.2d at 333.
No. 9023. slip op. (Ct. App. Ohio July I, 1969).
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merger by the defendant Pure Oil Company, brought an action pursuant to section
1701.85 of the Ohio Revised Code.'' They sought a determination of the fair cash
value of their shares, which they claimed to be worth $75 each.' The court-
appointed appraisers, however, valuated the shareholders' stock at $66 a share.
' 2
The appraisers based this determination on several factors, including data related to
asset value and going concern value." 3 The trial court subsequently rendered a
decision confirming the appraisers' evaluation.'' 4 On appeal, the Franklin County
Court of Appeals adopted and applied the standard set forth in Vought.' '" To wit, the
court held that where the price at which shares are traded in an active market can be
ascertained, such actual market price would in fact be the willing seller - willing
buyer amount dictated by the statute.'' 6 Notably, prior to the Armstrong decision,
Vought and Parten constituted the only reported cases interpreting section 1701.85(C)
of the Ohio Revised Code since the statute's enactment in 1955.
ARMSTRONG V. MARATHON OIL Co.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Armst-ong v. Marathon Oil Co., held that when
a corporate stock is actively traded, the actual market price is that stock's fair cash
value. ' 7 In doing so, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically adopted the dictum of
Vought and the holding of Parten, and, thereby, implicitly rejected the Roessler
holding and the intrinsic value method of valuation. The court pointed out several
rationales that supported the analyses set forth in Vought and Parten. The court
observed that since the turn of the century, the typical investor has shifted from
businessmen who had an entrepreneurial concern with the profit possibilities and
records of the company into which they put their money, to workers and profession-
als who are concerned with assured incomes and long-term appreciation." I These
modem-day investors do not take an interest in or closely scrutinize corporate
operations; they are investment-minded rather than enterprise-oriented." 9 In addi-
'"Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8.
'Id.
,,a Id.
IS Id. at 17.
Id.
',7 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 397 syl. para. 2. 513 N.E.2d 776, 776 syl. para. 2 (1987).
''1 Id. at 408, 513 N.E.2d at 786-87 (citing J. Hurst. The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law
of the United States 1780-1970 86 (1970)).
Id. (citing J. Hurst, supra note 118. at 86). One commentator stated that:
[lIn substantially every case other than [those] related to control, the owner of shares
of a company listed on a national securities exchange regards himself as an investor in
those securities, rather than as a part of the corporate enterprise. The investor's
objective is not to promote the income of the corporation but to enhance his distributive
share. not to increase the corporate assets but to enhance the value of his securities.
Since the measurement of these objectives is provided by the exchanges.. .dissent and
appraisal no longer Ishould bel required.
/d. at 408, 513 N.E.2d at 787 (citing Note. A Reconsideration. supra note 28, at 1029).
The last part of the quote. "dissent and appraisal no longer [should be] required." referred to a
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tion, most investors possess little or no knowledge of the value of a corporation's
assets, its going concern value, its future earnings value, or other factors often used
to ascertain a stock's intrinsic value. 1 2" The court, therefore, considered it unreason-
able to utilize valuation techniques based upon factors the investor himself rarely
contemplates.'
21
The court also championed the use of the market price as the best gauge of fair
cash value because of its accuracy and efficiency.122 Citing a number of studies, the
court indicated that the market price of a share usually fluctuates in random fashion
within a range quite near the actual value of the stock. 23 Thus, since the market has
already efficiently appraised the stock, and its appraisal is generally as accurate as
that of any court-appointed team, the court asserted that the market price reflects that
amount envisaged by the legislature when it adopted the willing seller-willing buyer
standard as the measure of fair cash value.1
2
1
According to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals, by rejecting the actual
market price as the fair cash value of a dissenter's share of stock and instead holding
that the value per share should be determined by a hypothetical sale, was "simply
incorrect." 25 Rather than constructing hypothetical sales, the supreme court sug-
gested that courts focus first on the major exchanges and then on the smaller
exchanges or over-the-counter sales to determine whether there was sufficient
trading to establish a market price.' 26 Where market activity was significant, the
court concluded, the market price should be used as a benchmark.
27
Clearly there was significant market activity in the case sub judice. The
evidence adduced at the trial showed that from November 2, 1981, to March 10,
1982, more than thirty-five million shares of Marathon stock, representing about
widespread movement during the decade between the early 1960s and the early 1970s. in which several states
withdrew the right of a dissenting shareholder to demand that his stock be appraised and the corporation
compelled to purchase his stock at its appraised value. See Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 1023-
26. This scheme, which is still present in many states, was known as the " stock market exception," so-called
because stockholders were forced either to accede to the corporate action with which they disagreed or to sell
their shares on the market. Id. at 1024-26.
'- Arnstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 408-09. 513 N.E.2d at 787.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 409-10, 513 N.E.2d at 788.
'3 Id. at 409, 513 N.E.2d at 787 (citing Ball & Brown, An Entirical Evaluation ofI'Accototing lItncome
Numbers, 6 J. Acc. RES. 159(1968); Crouch, A Nonlinear Test ofthe Random- Walk Hypothesis. 60 Am. EcON.
REv. 199(1970); Fama & Blume, FilterRules andStock Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226(1966); Fama, Fisher,
Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New hnJornmation, 10 INT'L ECON. REV. I (1969); Granger
& Morgenstern, Spectral Analysis of New York Stock Market Prices, 16 Kyklos I (1963). discussed in
BAUMOL, Ti I I- STOCK MARKET AND EcoNOMIc EFFICIENCY 40-41 (1965); Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case
of Merging Firns, I J. FtNAN. ECON. 303 (1974); Scholes, TheMarketforSecurities: Substitution versus Price
Pressure and the Effects of hfln/rnation on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972)).
'24 Armstrong. 32 Ohio St. 3d at 409, 412, 513 N.E.2d at 787, 790.
12_ Id. at 411, 513 N.E.2d at 789.
'26 Id. at 412, 513 N.E.2d at 790.
127 Id.
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62% of the company's total shares outstanding, were traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. 28 Ironically, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case because the trial court gave the market price controlling emphasis without
considering whether the proposed merger had influenced the price of the stock. 129
The trial court had found the fair cash value on January 6, 1982, to be $78 a
share. 3 ' That day, according to the lower court, was the last effective trading day
before the merger took place."'3 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in two respects. First, the correct date for the valuation of the stock should have
been March 10, 1982, and not January 6, 1982. 132 The statute mandates that fair cash
value be determined as of the day prior to the shareholder vote on the merger in
question.'33 Although the merger effectively took place on January 7, 1982, when
U.S. Steel acquired a controlling interest in Marathon, the shareholders did not
approve the merger until March 11, 1982. '3 Therefore, the court held, the valuation
date should have been March 10, 1982, the day before the shareholders' vote as pre-
scribed by the statute.' 35
According to the court, the trial court committed its second error by failing to
take into consideration the impact of the U.S. Steel tender offer on the market price
of Marathon's stock.136 As the court pointed out, section 1701.85(C) states that when
computing fair cash value, courts should exclude from that amount any appreciation
or depreciation in market value resulting from the proposal submitted to the directors
or the shareholders. 37 The trial court denied any appreciation in its fair cash price
determination, 38 despite salient evidence that the bandied about merger discussions
tremendously inflated the value of Marathon's stock.'3 9 Accordingly, the Ohio
"21 Id. at 410, 513 N.E.2d at 788-89. Marathon had 56,689,306 shares outstanding on March 10, 1982. Id.
'21 Id. at 413, 513 N.E.2d at 791.
'31 Price v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 43273, slip op. at 61 (C.P. Ohio Dec. 27, 1983).
131 Id.
'32 Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 413, 513 N.E.2d at 791.
133 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987).
134 Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 400, 513 N.E.2d at 780.
135 Id. at 413, 513 N.E.2d at 791.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 413, 513 N.E.2d at 790. Appraisal statutes are intended to compensate the dissenter for his shares
in the original corporation, before that corporation undergoes a fundamental change. See supra note 28 for
articles discussing the purpose of the appraisal remedy. Accordingly, the Ohio statute provides that a
dissenting shareholder is entitled to the value of his shares unaffected by any appreciation ordepreciation that
might be caused by the corporate action from which he dissented. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C)
(Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987). A dissenting shareholder, however, will never be able to sell his shares on
the market at a price unaffected by the proposed change since market prices instantaneously adjust to new
information. See Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 1052. Therefore, to prevent dissenting
shareholders from receiving a windfall from appreciated stock or suffering unjustly from falling stock prices,
the statute mandates that the court determine the point where the information concerning the impending
action began to affect the market and adjust the price accordingly. Oito REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C)
(Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987).
'
18 
Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 413, 513 N.E.2d at 791.
3 Price v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 43273, slip op. at 36-40 (C.P. Ohio Dec. 27, 1983). To illustrate, the.
following is a chronology of how Marathon's stock performed on the New York Stock Exchange during the
various merger proposals.
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Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the trial court should
have considered all evidence concerned with, or reasonably affecting, any apprecia-
On Friday, October 30, 1981, the last day of trading prior to the announcement of Mobil's offer,
Marathon's stock was selling for $67 1/2. Id. at 40. When the market opened that following Monday
(November 2), Marathon's stock had escalated to a high of $90 a share. Id. The price of the stock dropped
dramatically over the next few weeks, however, as Marathon initiated an antitrust suit against Mobil with the
outcome pending in the federal courts. Id. at 41.
From a low of $77 a share on November 18, the stock jumped in just two days an incredible 30 points,
to reach $107 3/4, which, at that date, was an all-time high. Id. at 40, Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 413, 513
N.E.2d at 790. The November 20th bonanza was precipitated by the announcement of U.S. Steel's two-tier
offer to purchase a controlling interest of Marathon stock. Price, No. 43273 at 40. The price again slowly
dropped, however, as Mobil filed suit against Marathon and U.S. Steel on December 13th alleging that U.S.
Steel had engaged in manipulative practices in connection with its tender offer in violation of the Williams
Act. Id. at 41. The price continued to sink until the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on
December 17th, ruled that U.S. Steel's tender offer violated the Williams Act and ordered the lock-out
provision on the purchase of the Yates oilfield voided. Id. at 41-42.
On January 7, 1982, the day U.S. Steel purchased approximately 51% of Marathon stock, the market
hovered around $78 a share. Id. at Appendix 0. When the shareholders finally approved of the merger on
March I1, 1982, Marathon's stock was selling for $76 a share. Id. at Appendix N.
Through a statistical technique known as regression analysis, one of Marathon's expert witnesses
produced a chart that projected the price of Marathon Oil Company stock from October 30, 1981 (the date
of Mobil's tender), through March 10, 1982 (the day before Marathon's shareholders voted to merge with
U.S. Steel), had there been no Mobil or U.S. Steel tender offer. Id. at 39. Under this technique, not only was
the hypothetical price of Marathon's stock calculated, but the prices of both integrated domestic oil
companies and integrated international oil companies were traced as well. Id. By analyzing the performance
of these comparable integrated oil companies during the same period (October 30 through March 10),
Marathon's expert witness concluded that absent the Mobil and U.S. Steel tenders, the value of Marathon
stock on March 10, 1982 would have dropped to $49.72 a share, afortiori, considering the oil industry's
concurrent worldwide slump. Id. at 39-40 & Appendix I.
The chart below demonstrates the drop in the weekly Standard & Poor Index for several international
oil companies, including; Exxon, GulfOil, Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of California, and Texaco,
during the period paralleling the Marathon merger activities.
1981 1982
Week Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
1st 210 211 220 202 186 176
2nd 205 205 219 195 186 182
3rd 207 206 212 191 182
4th 207 217 210 193 183
5th 210
Id. at Appendix J.
Marathon's expert witness also provided evidence which showed the weekly Standard & Poor Index
for the domestic oil companies. These companies included: Atlantic-Richfield, Occidental Petroleum, Getty
Oil, Phillips Petroleum, Shell Oil (U.S.), Standard Oil (Indiana), Standard Oil (Ohio), Sun Company, and
Union Oil of California (Unocal Corp.).
1981 1982
Week Oct. Not,. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
1st 331 354 347 312 283 236
2nd 314 339 357 291 272 237
3rd 323 325 345 290 265
4th 327 343 339 289 259
5th 338
Id. at Appendix K.
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tion of the stock.140
DISCUSSION
Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co. represented the Ohio Supreme Court's first
consideration of the meaning and application of the willing seller-willing buyer
definition to the words "fair cash value."' 4 ' Although there are some minor flaws
in the court's analysis in Armstrong, the court advanced the clearest definition of
"fair cash value" to date. Along the way, it cleared up many misconceptions
regarding the willing seller-willing buyer (hypothetical market) theory. 142
There is one noteworthy blemish in the court's analysis. The Ohio Supreme
Court draws certain inferences from the statutory language of section 1701.85(C)
while ignoring other equally plausible, yet contradictory inferences. Section
1701.85(C) defines fair cash value of a share as the amount that "a willing seller,
under no compulsion to sell, would be willing to accept, and that a willing buyer,
under no compulsion to purchase, would be willing to pay." 43 Although explicit
resort to the actual price of the actively traded shares can be found in the dictum of
Vought and the holdings of Parten and Armstrong, it is conspicuously absent from
the statute. 144 Nowhere in the statute do the words "stock market price" appear. The
Ohio General Assembly certainly could have said, "Judge, look to the stock
market," but the legislature did not. This omission may merely reflect the
legislature's intention that the statute apply to closely-held corporations whose
Lastly, Marathon's expert witness illustrated that the closing prices of these domestic oil companies,
as traded on the New York Stock Exchange, dropped approximately 30% from November30, 198 1, to March
10, 1982.
Closing Closing
Price Price Change
Company 10-30-81 3-10-82
Atlantic Richfield 48 1/8 35 5/8 -12 1/2
Cities Service 48 3/4 25 -23 3/4
Getty Oil 63 1/4 43 1/8 -20 1/8
Phillips Petroleum 41 1/4 27 1/2 -13 3/4
Shell (US) 433/4 29 -143/4
Standard Oil (Ind) 50 1/2 36 1/4 -14 1/4
Standard Oil (Ohio) 43 3/8 33 1/4 -10 1/8
Sun 39 1/4 303/4 -8 1/2
Union (Unocal Corp) 40 1/8 29 1/4 -10 7/8
Id. at Appendix L.
"" Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 413, 513 N.E.2d at 791.
'4' Id. at 406-07, 513 N.E.2d at 785.
'12These misconceptions are evidenced by the fact that both the trial court and appellate court interpreted the
willing seller-willing buyer standard differently; both, according to the Ohio Supreme Court, incorrectly. Id.
at 411,413,513 N.E.2d at 789, 791.
113 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987).
' See text and accompanying notes 106-37 supra for cases asserting that when an active market exists, the
fair cash value of a share of stock is the actual market price. 17
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shares are not traded on a stock exchange, as well as the large conglomerates like
Marathon Oil. On the other hand, the statute's failure to mention the stock market
price may indicate the legislature's wariness of the inherent imperfections of the
stock exchanges as an indicator of value and its choice not to rely on them.
If the latter conjecture is true, the Ohio Supreme Court clearly ignored the
legislature's concerns. Rather than creating a hypothetical market value as called for
by the statute, the supreme court instead adopted the actual market price as the sole
criterion of corporate stock value. 4" There are, however, compelling arguments
regarding the accuracy of the stock market as an indicator of value that militate
against its use. If the public stock market functioned as a perfect market, where all
actors relied upon complete and accurate information, the courts would need to look
only to the stock market price and the valuation of dissenter's shares would be greatly
simplified. Unfortunately, a perfect market is only a theoretical ideal. In the real
world the stock market is less than a perfect indicator of the value of a corporate
concern.
There are several reasons why a corporations's intrinsic value and its market
price may not, necessarily, be one and the same. First, investors frequently react to
inaccurate stock information or are unable to interpret accurate information.
146
Second, because corporate information travels at different speeds, those investors
who first receive the information are able to take advantage of the discrepancy
between stock price and stock value. Theoretically, such a discrepancy should not
exist. In reality, however, such a discrepancy will nearly always exist since market
participants are seldom completely informed. '47Third, when the transaction costs of
buying and selling a particular stock exceed the difference between that stock's price
and its value, many investors refrain from participating in the market. 48 Fourth,
many external factors disturb the market's natural operation. For example, the
prudent investor always takes into account the tax implications surrounding a
purchase or sale of stock, even though the tax system bears no relation to that stock's
underlying value.'49 Fifth, many individual investors rely on "tips" - which usually
contain incomplete or inaccurate information - when deciding whether to invest in
obscure corporations.'"" This, again, tends to distort stock market prices. Finally,
relatively few investors, even among professionals, are able to fully grasp the myriad
complexities inherent in the stock market.''
Recent stock market activity supports the proposition that market prices may,
at times, vary from a stock's intrinsic value. Market prices often reflect "speculative
14S Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 397 syl. para. 2, 513 N.E.2d at 776 syl. para. 2.
46 See Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 1038.
147 Id.
14H Id.4 
9 Id .
o Id.
I. Id.
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optimism," an environment characterized by individuals who base their investment
decisions upon irrational or visceral responses rather than upon logical considera-
tions such as a company's assets or earnings strength. 52 For example, the prices of
"growth stocks" frequently exceed the companies' earnings potential.'53 In con-
trast, investors tend to undervalue the less glamorous corporations despite the high
earnings potential these companies possess. 114 Moreover, while stock market prices
rise and fall quite rapidly in today's uncertain investment climate, it is doubtful that
such extreme fluctuations coincide with changes in the intrinsic values of the
shares.' 55 Indeed, recent stock market prices indicate a somewhat inefficient market.
For instance, while temperatures soared during the summer of 1985, stocks listed on
the New York Stock Exchange traded at 30% below their underlying asset value.
56
Just two years later, experts attributed the fact that stock prices were way overpriced
in relation to their underlying asset value as the primary cause of the October 19,
1987, stock market "crash." 157 Thus, a good case can be made that the Ohio General
Assembly adopted the willing seller-willing buyer standard to act as a safeguard
against the vagaries of an uncertain market. Specifically, it would prevent dissenting
shareholders from receiving a windfall during an inflated market and suffering
unjustly during a depressed market. If this is true, the Ohio Supreme Court, by
adopting the actual market price as the measure of fair cash value, thwarted the
legislature's intent. '51
The legislature, however, failed to make its intention known. Therefore, if the
Ohio Supreme Court made certain inferences as to the meaning of the willing seller-
willing buyer standard, it was only because those inferences were necessary to arrive
at a fair cash value determination. As provided in the statute, the willing seller-
willing buyer standard is amorphous and prone to subjective, ad hoc interpretations
by the lower courts. The willing seller-willing buyer standard, as enunciated by the
Armsti-ong court, takes on a definitive shape: Whenever there is active trading of a
particular stock in question, that stock's actual market price represents its fair cash
value. 59 Adopting such a standard does no violence to the willing seller-willing
buyer (hypothetical market) theory; under the right circumstances, the market price
is the amount a willing seller would accept and a willing buyer would pay for a share
112 Id. at 1038-39.
1-.3 Id. at 1039.
14 Id.
155 Id. at 1039-40.
16 See Note, Corporate Lao--Chipping Away, supra note 28, at 216-17 (citing Kinsley, You Won't Find an
Efficient Market on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1985, at 25, col. 2).
'51 See, e.g., Stock Market May Surprise Investors (Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 26, 1988) (transcribed in
LEXis, NEXis library, OMNI file) (" Prior to the crash, stocks had been badly overpriced"); Stocksfora Difficult
Market. FORTUNE, Dec. 21, 1987, at 176 ("The market was overvalued, and at the same time there was less
and less liquidity in the economy to support it"); Ramirez, Still Bullish at the Top, FORTUNE, Nov. 23, 1987,
at 90 ("The market will languish for a while, and I think it should, because it was way overpriced").
"' See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 397 syl. para. 2, 513 N.E.2d 776, 776 syl. para.
2 (1987). For a discussion of the Armstrong holding, see text accompanying notes 117-40 supra.
"' Id. at 397 syl. para. 2, 513 N.E.2d at 776 syl. para. 2.
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of stock. 6 11 Other jurisdictions have also recognized the virtue of using the stock
market price as a measure of value. In fact, one court has gone so far as to lambaste
those jurisdictions that continue to utilize such nebulous terms as "fair cash value,"
"intrinsic value," "real value," and "fair value." It stated:
We do not know what those terms or others like them mean, and we
suspect that the writers who advocate them do not know either. They
use them because they distrust the market as a gauge of value. Yet
realistically, under our economic system, the value of any item of
property on any given date, in monetary terms, is what it can be sold for
in a free and fair market.
161
The stock exchange is, thus, a paradigm of the willing seller-willing buyer
standard. As one court observed: "The market may not always appear to be in line
with earnings, dividends, or asset value, but in the market all the factors which enter
into a realistic determination of value are appraised by those who are most realistic,
the actual buyers and sellers."' 1
62
To be sure, the modem investor's objective is not to promote the income of the
corporation or to increase its assets. "" Rather, his single-minded goal is to increase
his distributive share of the corporation and enhance the value of his securities. "4To
the extent that the stock exchange measures the investor's success in accomplishing
these objectives, it is the most useful criterion to determine value. 61 To the extent
that the actual market price most accurately reflects value to an investor, its adoption
as the measure of fair cash value satisfies the shareholder's investment expecta-
tions. 166
Perhaps the practical aspects of adopting the actual market price as a value
indicator provide an even more compelling argument than the theoretical grounds.
Appraisal proceedings are expensive for the participants and extremely time
consuming. 67 For an appraiser or a court to consider factors like net asset value,
going concern value, liquidation value, net equity value, earnings value of the stock
or dividends prospects, the nature of the enterprise and its relative position within the
particular industry, and a myriad of other equitable concerns68 may impose such a
IJ ld. at 411, 513 N.E.2d at 789.
" See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock, supra note 28, at 1461 (quoting Gallois v. West End Chem. Co.,
185 Cal. App. 2d 765,774, 8 Cal. Rptr. 596, 601-02 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
12 Id. at 1461 (quoting Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923,936, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349, 359-60 (Sup. Ct. 1945), affd
mem., 270 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1946)).
'13 Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 408, 513 N.E.2d at 787 (citing Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 28, at
1029).
. M Id.
16' Id.
1,1 Id. at 409, 513 N.E.2d at 787.
17 Id. at 408-09, 513 N.E.2d at 787-88; see also Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 1030-3 1.
"' Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 404, 513 N.E.2d at 783-84.
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cost on the dissenter that his recovery will fall below the full value of his shares. 169
Additionally, it may, in the extreme, completely offset his recovery.7" In contrast,
using the market price as the measure of value greatly narrows the scope of the
appraisers' inquiry because if there is an active market present, the only factor
bearing on a share's fair cash value is the actual market price. Thus, the appraisal
proceeding is quicker and less expensive. Concomitantly, the corporation is less
vulnerable to strike suits by dissenting shareholders because the threat of drawn-out,
costly litigation is mitigated.' 7 '
Moreover, by utilizing the stock market price as the beginning point of
analysis, the final outcome becomes more predictable and pre-appraisal settlement,
therefore, becomes a more viable alternative. 7 2 Should litigation proceed, the
narrower scope of analysis established by the willing seller-willing buyer criterion
will reduce both discovery costs and attorney fees.'73 To summarize, whether
adoption of the market price increases pre-appraisal settlements or reduces appraisal
proceeding costs, all parties involved benefit. The dissenting shareholders receive
an amount consistent with their investment expectations, absent exorbitant legal
fees, and the majority shareholders' investment is not unduly damaged since less cor-
porate funds will be expended to participate in the appraisal proceeding.'74
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court wisely adopted the market price as a measure
of fair cash value. As stated earlier, the stock market is less than a perfect indicator
of the value of a corporate concern. However, in an imperfect world, the stock
market provides the most simple, inexpensive, and reliable means of determining a
share's value with which the courts have to work.'75 Most other criteria are fraught
with complexity and susceptible to subjective applications. In sum, the stock market
is an efficient market that accurately and objectively reflects what the willing seller,
under no compulsion to sell, is willing to accept and the willing buyer, under no
compulsion to purchase, is willing to pay for a share of stock. In Armstrong, the Ohio
Supreme Court laid down a standard that will accomplish what the appraisal statute
sets out to do: "[A]l low the dissenter to exit the market in basically the same manner,
and by the same terms, as he entered.'
'
1
7 6
CONCLUSION
On October 30, 198 1, the opening salvo in what became "the largest action for
" See Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 1060-63.
70 Id.
"I' Id.; see also Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 408-10, 513 N.E.2d at 787-88.
172 Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 409-10, 513 N.E.2d at 787-88.
173 Id.
174 Id.
"I' See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock, supra note 28, at 1463-64.
'
7
6 Armstrong, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 412, 513 N.E.2d at 790.
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relief to dissenting shareholders in the judicial history of Ohio" was launched.'77 It
took six long years for the smoke to clear, but by elucidating a theoretically and
practicably cogent analysis of the Ohio appraisal statute, the Armstrong case has
provided plentiful ammunition for the lower courts in Ohio to combat the inevitable
onslaught of dissenting shareholders resulting from the proliferation of corporate
takeovers.
' Price v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 43273, slip op. at I (C.P. Ohio Dec. 27, 1983).
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